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Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
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Results for mara salvatrucha
9 results foundAuthor: Alcantara, Mariana Del Rocio Title: Mara Salvatrucha and Transnational Crime in North and Central America: Uncovering the External Links and Internal Dynamics Summary: The assimilation of organised crime into transnational crime has had detrimental effects on the national and regional security of countries around the world. Transnational crime has increasingly become a security concern, as organised gangs have permeated across borders with enhanced sophistication with minimal regard for law enforcement. Mara Salvatruchal (also known as MS or MS-13) is an organisation that has rapidly spread from its initial location on the West Coast of the United States to other parts of the country as well as neighbouring nations in Central America. The main aspect of this thesis is the activities of Mara Salvatrucha in North and Central America and the analysis of the internal and external dynamics that have enabled the organisation to expand and become one of the most feared organised gangs in the American Continent. Hence, this thesis critically analyses the anti-crime prevention measures put into action in the hope of curbing and eliminating the security threats that MS and its members provide within the region. Transnational crime theory is a core component of this thesis as it identifies numerous factors that are associated with this transnational organisation and will effectively put internal and external dynamics of MS into perspective. The objective of this thesis is therefore to use a case study methodology on Mara Salvatrucha to emphasise the law enforcement strategies that have thus far been deployed to control the increasing level of gang related violence taking place in the United States and Central American nations. Details: Adelaide, Australia: School of International Studies, University of South Australia, 2007. 106p. Source: Internet Resource; Thesis Year: 2007 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 119512 Keywords: GangsMara SalvatruchaOrganized CrimeTransnational Crime |
Author: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Title: Issue Paper: Youth Gang Organizations in El Salvador Summary: This Issue Paper was drafted by the Department of State’s Office of Asia and Western Hemisphere Affairs in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor for use by the Executive Office of Immigration Review and the Department of Homeland Security in assessing asylum claims.a It is intended to provide a convenient, updated summary regarding gang organizations in El Salvador.b Under 8 C.F.R. 208.11 and 1208.11, the Department of State may provide information on country conditions that may be pertinent to the adjudication of asylum claims.c The purpose of this issue paper is to present information relating to such conditions;d it is not intended to convey a description of all of the possible circumstances from which legitimate asylum claims may arise. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2007. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 22, 2013 Year: 2007 Country: El Salvador URL: Shelf Number: 129136 Keywords: 18th Street GangAsylumMara SalvatruchaViolenceYouth Gangs (El Salvador) |
Author: Hampton-Gaines, Berthea G. Title: State Capacity and Effectiveness in Combating Crime: A Comparative Study of El Salvador and Guatemala Summary: Less than two decades after the conclusion of brutal civil wars, El Salvador and Guatemala are once again faced with high levels of violence stemming from drug trafficking, organized crime, corruption, and gangs. Overall, El Salvador was more successful in post-war state building. However, despite having stronger institutions and more capabilities, it is not better off when it comes to public security when compared to Guatemala, a state with weaker institutions and fewer resources. In fact, El Salvador’s homicide rates have been consistently higher. According to prevailing conventional wisdom, a country with stronger institutions and more resources should be more capable and effective at maintaining order, but this is not the case. This thesis examines the nature of crime, institutional capacity, and the effectiveness of government responses to reduce violent crime. It argues that decisions made during the transition period set these states on different paths. Furthermore, while strong institutions are important to maintaining order, government policy can strengthen or weaken the effectiveness of the institution. Strong institutions are necessary, but not sufficient. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2012. 95p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed June 22, 2013 at: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=719163 Year: 2012 Country: Central America URL: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=719163 Shelf Number: 129145 Keywords: Drug TraffickingGangs (El Salvador, Guatemala, Central America)HomicidesM-18Mara SalvatruchaMS-13Organized CrimeViolent Crime |
Author: Cruz, Jose Miguel Title: Global Gangs in El Salvador: Maras and the Politics of Violence Summary: Where does Mara Salvatrucha come from? How did the U.S.-born Eighteenth Street Gang become a powerhouse of the Salvadoran streets? The Mara Salvatrucha, also known as the MS- 13, and the Eighteenth Street Gang, branded also as Barrio 18, are the two major youth gangs in El Salvador. According to different sources (Aguilar and Miranda 2006; USAID 2006), between 2002 and 2006, both gangs comprised more than 87 percent of gang membership in El Salvador. These gangs are known not only because of their control of the Salvadoran neighborhoods and most of the prisons nowadays, but also because groups of street gangs using those same names are found in every country of the North American hemisphere from Canada to Honduras, and even some cliques have been reported in distant countries such as Australia, Germany and Bolivia. Yet, the common answer to the question as to why MS-13 and the Eighteenth Street Gang are the major gangs in this Central American country is usually narrowed to the backwardand- forward migration of Salvadorans to the United States. The evidence, however, points to a more intricate response. Migration and deportation policies in the United States have indeed played an important role in boosting the phenomenon of street gangs in El Salvador, but it is an overstatement and a naivety to say that the dominance of MS-13 and Barrio 18 in Central America and their seemingly growing transnational character is essentially the result of the circular Salvadoran migration to the U.S. Should we accept this argument alone, we would find difficult to explain why the Eighteenth Street Gang, a gang originally formed by Chicanos and Mexican immigrants, have not put down roots in Mexican soil as they have done in El Salvador; or why the Belizean Crips and Bloods have not developed in the same way as the Salvadoran gangs. Gangs are the outcome of different factors. Marginalization, migration, street cross-culturalization, and —what I shall call— the politics of violence, being the key ones to explain the rise and predominance of the youth gangs in El Salvador, also locally known as maras. This article draws substantial theoretical insight from the work of Vigil (2002) on multiple marginalization, Hagedorn (2008) on gang institutionalization, and Decker on the dynamics of gang violence (Decker 1996; Decker, Bynum, and Weisel 1998; Decker and Van Winkle 1996); and is based on the research program on gangs developed by the University of Central America in San Salvador (Aguilar 2007; Carranza 2005; Cruz and Portillo Peña 1998; ERIC et al. 2001; Santacruz and Concha-Eastman 2001) and other institutions (Smutt and Miranda 1998). It argues that contemporary street Salvadoran gangs emerged as a result of social conditions in El Salvador, then they were shaped by the intensive exchange of young people, cultural goods and policies between the U.S. and El Salvador, and were finally strengthened by the need to deal with the mano dura (firm hand) policies, and extralegal violent actors stemming from state institutions and civil society. The paper is divided in three sections. The first part addresses the factors that lie behind the emergence of gangs as a major social issue in El Salvador; then, it reviews the path of gangs strengthening and the process through which they became street powerhouses not only in El Salvador but also in the region. Finally, the paper analyzes the link between gangs and violence in a country considered one of the most violent nations in the western hemisphere (UNODC 2007). Details: Paper presented at the Global Gangs Workshop, Centre on Conflict, Development, and Peacebuilding, Geneva, May 14-15, 2009. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 16, 2013 at: http://graduateinstitute.ch/webdav/site/ccdp/shared/5039/Cruz-global-gangs-in-el-salvador.pdf Year: 2009 Country: El Salvador URL: http://graduateinstitute.ch/webdav/site/ccdp/shared/5039/Cruz-global-gangs-in-el-salvador.pdf Shelf Number: 129410 Keywords: Gang ViolenceGangs (El Salvador)Mara Salvatrucha |
Author: Seelke, Clare Ribando Title: Gangs in Central America Summary: Congress has maintained an interest in the effects of gang violence in Central America, and on the expanding activities of transnational gangs with ties to that region operating in the United States. Since FY2008, Congress has appropriated significant amounts of funding for anti-gang efforts in Central America, as well as domestic anti-gang programs. This report focuses primarily on U.S.-funded international anti-gang efforts. The Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and its main rival, the "18th Street" gang (also known as M-18), continue to threaten citizen security and challenge government authority in Central America. Gang-related violence has been particularly acute in Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, which have had among the highest homicide rates in the world. Recently, some governments have moved away from repressive anti-gang strategies, with the government of El Salvador having facilitated a historic-and risky-truce involving the country's largest gangs in 2012. The truce contributed to a large reduction in homicides, before beginning to unravel in recent months. The truce carries risks for the Salvadoran government that will take office on June 1, 2014, such as what might happen if the gangs were to walk away from the truce stronger than before and/or if the truce were to end abruptly and prompt an escalation in intra-gang violence. U.S. agencies have engaged on both the law enforcement and preventive sides of dealing with Central American gangs; an inter-agency committee developed a U.S. Strategy to Combat Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico that was announced in July 2007. The strategy focuses on diplomacy, repatriation, law enforcement, capacity enhancement, and prevention. An April 2010 study by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommended that U.S. agencies consider strengthening the anti-gang strategy by developing better oversight and measurement tools to guide its implementation. U.S. law enforcement efforts may be bolstered by the Treasury Department's October 2012 designation of the MS-13 as a major Transnational Criminal Organization (TCO) subject to sanctions pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13581. In recent years, Congress has dedicated funding to support anti-gang efforts in Central America. Between FY2008 and FY2013, Congress appropriated roughly $38 million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds for anti-gang efforts in Central America. Congress provided additional support in FY2008 and FY2009 for anti-gang efforts in the region through the Merida Initiative, a counterdrug and anticrime program for Mexico and Central America, and, more recently, through the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). Congressional oversight may focus on the efficacy of anti-gang efforts in Central America; the interaction between U.S. domestic and international anti-gang policies, and the impact of the Treasury Department's TCO designation on law enforcement efforts against MS-13. This report describes the gang problem in Central America, discusses country approaches to deal with the gangs, and analyzes U.S. policy with respect to gangs in Central America. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: RL34112: Accessed March 18, 2014 at: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34112.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Central America URL: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34112.pdf Shelf Number: 131956 Keywords: 18th Street GangGang-Related ViolenceGangsM-18Mara SalvatruchaMS-13Violence |
Author: Garrett, Linda Title: The First Year: A Chronology of the Gang Truce and Peace Process in El Salvador: March 2012 - March 2013 Summary: Since March of 2012, El Salvador has experienced an unprecedented drop in violence due to a truce between the countrys two largest street gangs, the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Barrio 18. Exceeding many early expectations, the truce has lasted over a year, and evolved to encompass a broader peace process within Salvadoran society. The extent to which the Salvadoran government has been involved in the process, even the nature of its involvement, remains uncertain and is a source of contention. But, the ongoing truce and peace process presents real lessons and serious public policy implications and now, with many communities signing on to the "violence-free municipality" initiative and thousands of lives saved by an over 50% reduction in homicides, much is at stake. Even before news of the truce was broadly known, the Center for Democracy in the Americas (CDA) had been monitoring the unfolding process in El Salvador, when a Salvadoran government official hinted to us in February 2012 that a dialogue between the gangs might be underway. In the pages below, we present our chronology of the process compiled over the last year, which details this historic series of events. The chronology provides a more complete picture of the process as it developed day-by-day during the first year: from the original confusing, contradictory versions of its creation, to the various commitments and good-will gestures offered by gang leaders. The truce’s advances and setbacks are chronicled, alongside the suspicions and distrust expressed by many Salvadorans. It also records the critical support provided by the Organization of American States (OAS). Finally, the chronology helps us understand the motivations of the facilitators and gang leaders. It gives us a glimpse into the lives and thoughts of young people who are struggling to find a way out of tumultuous lives of poverty, crime and often unspeakable violence. This chronology, focused on the gang truce and peace process, complements CDA's extensive coverage of developments in El Salvador. It is CDA's hope that the full telling of this story will encourage the debate and reflection, already underway in El Salvador, about the issues of exclusion and poverty, so closely connected to the causes of and solutions for the violence. The human dimensions highlighted here are crucial when considering policy choices; choices that heavily impact the lives of so many Salvadorans, not only in El Salvador but also in the diaspora. The Salvadoran government faces the challenges of developing a coherent public policy, that recognizes the possibility of human transformation from criminal to productive lives, and providing resources to implement that policy. If successful, the peace process could perhaps be the most significant legacy of the current government. It should be emphasized that the truce in itself is not the solution, but it has transformed the conversation from repression to prevention and rehabilitation. As President Funes said, the only options for youth have been to emigrate or join a gang for survival. To change that dynamic, the peace process must be institutionalized and funded as part of a long-term strategy to provide educational and job opportunities to all at-risk youth in the historically impoverished barrios and municipalities of the country. Advocacy of the peace process does not signify impunity for crimes committed. Nor does it reflect ignorance of the horrific violence inflicted on the Salvadoran people and their communities in recent decades: the murders of thousands of youths; the savagery of sexual violence; dismembered bodies; clandestine cemeteries; the uprooting of fearful families, and the scourge of extortion. Advocacy does mean a belief in the possibility of redemption. It reflects aspirations for an inclusive, nonviolent, democratic future for the country. "If it doesn't work," Bishop Colindres said, "we will have lost a little effort and illusions, but if it works the country will have found peace." Details: Washington, DC: Center for Democracy in the Americas, 2013. 72p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 11, 2016 at: http://democracyinamericas.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/First-Year-Chronology-of-El-Salvadors-Gang-Truce.pdf Year: 2013 Country: El Salvador URL: http://democracyinamericas.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/First-Year-Chronology-of-El-Salvadors-Gang-Truce.pdf Shelf Number: 139373 Keywords: Barrio 18Gang ViolenceGang-Related ViolenceGangsMara SalvatruchaViolence Prevention |
Author: InSight Crime Title: MS13 in the Americas: How the World's Most Notorious Gang Defies Logic, Resists Destruction Summary: The Mara Salvatrucha (MS13) is one of the world's largest and arguably most violent street gangs. After relatively humble beginnings in Los Angeles in the 1980s, it has spread to more than a half-dozen countries and become a central focus of law enforcement in two hemispheres. In spite of these efforts, the MS13 remains a persistent threat and shows signs of expanding its criminal portfolio. This report attempts to explain what makes the MS13 such a difficult problem for authorities to tackle. It focuses on assisting law enforcement's understanding of the gang's criminal activities, but it includes deep discussion on the social and political issues around the MS13. Below are our major findings. The MS13 is a largely urban phenomenon that has cells operating in two continents. The MS13 has between 50,000 and 70,000 members who are concentrated in mostly urban areas in Central America or locations outside the region where there is a large Central American diaspora. In Honduras and Guatemala, the gang is still largely urban. In El Salvador, however, the gang has steadily spread into more rural areas. Expansion beyond urban areas has also happened in places in the United States, most notably in Long Island and North Carolina, and increasingly California. The gang has appeared as well in Europe, specifically in urban areas of Spain and Italy. The size of the gang in these settings varies greatly and fluctuates, mostly in accordance with law enforcement efforts and migration patterns unrelated to the gang. The MS13 is a social organization first, and a criminal organization second. The MS13 is a complex phenomenon. The gang is not about generating revenue as much as it is about creating a collective identity that is constructed and reinforced by shared, often criminal experiences, especially acts of violence and expressions of social control. The MS13 draws on a mythic notion of community, a team concept, and an ideology based on its bloody fight with its chief rival, the Barrio 18 (18th Street) gang, to sustain a huge, loosely organized social and criminal organization. The MS13 is a diffuse organization of sub-parts, with no single leader or leadership structure that directs the entire gang. The MS13 has two poles of power: in Los Angeles, where it was founded, and in El Salvador, its spiritual birthplace where many of its historic leaders reside. But the gang has no single leader or leadership council. Instead it is a federation with layers of leaders who interact, obey and react to each other at different moments depending on circumstances. In general terms, most decisions are made by the individual cell, or what is known as the "clica," the Spanish term for clique. The highest-ranking members in some geographic areas make up a leadership council, but not all areas have a leadership council. In Los Angeles, the MS13 is subservient to the prison gang known as the Mexican Mafia. In El Salvador, the gang is also run from prison by its own leadership council. Along the East Coast of the United States, the gang has no council, although it is takes much of its directives from Salvadoran-based gang leaders. Because these leaders are mostly in jail, it is exceedingly difficult for them to impose total control over the rank-and-file. The MS13 has guidelines more than rules, which are subject to varying interpretations. The diffuse nature of the organization has widespread implications for how it operates. The gang has guidelines more than rules. These guidelines are subject to haphazard interpretations and application. In other words, this internal justice is not necessarily a strict system and often depends more on who the leader is and who is being judged, rather the actual transgression or the circumstances surrounding it. This inconsistent application of the rules leads to constant internal and external conflicts and is the cause of widespread violence wherever the gang operates. MS13 violence is brutal and purposeful. Violence is at the heart of the MS13 and is what has made it a target of law enforcement in the United States, Central America and beyond. It is central to the MS13's ethos, its modus operandi, and its evaluation and discipline of its own members. Violence also builds cohesion and comradery within the gang's cliques. This use of violence has enhanced the MS13's brand name, allowing it to expand in size and geographic reach, but it has undermined its ability to enter more sophisticated, money-making criminal economies. Potential partners see the gang as an unreliable, highly visible target, and the gang's violent spasms only reinforce this notion. The MS13's diffuse nature makes it hard for it to control its own expressions of violence. The MS13's diffuse nature has made it difficult to curtail its violence. The gang itself has attempted to implement rules to control the use of force. Most murders must be sanctioned from the highest levels, but as one of our case studies illustrates, this is often a perfunctory task, reflecting what seems to be a disregard for human life. In addition, the very system that is designed to control the violence often leads to more violence, since failure to carry out a sanctioned hit becomes cause for internal disciplinary action. The MS13 is a hand-to-mouth criminal organization that depends on control of territory to secure revenue. The gang's lack of a centralized leadership has kept it relatively impoverished. While it has established revenue streams, the MS13 has a hand-to-mouth criminal portfolio. Extortion is the single most important revenue stream for the gang in Central America, although a significant and rising portion of the MS13's criminal portfolio comes from local drug peddling, especially in US cities such as Los Angeles. The gang is also involved in prostitution, human smuggling, car theft and resale and other criminal activities, but the gang's revenue nearly always depends on its ability to control territory. The MS13 is a transnational gang, not a transnational criminal organization (TCO). While the gang has a presence in two continents and at least a half-dozen nations, the gang is a small, part-time role player in international criminal schemes. In cases of international drug trafficking, for instance, the MS13 is dependent on other criminal actors such as the Mexican Mafia. The gang plays a similar, part-time role in other international criminal activities such human smuggling as well. Its diffuse organizational structure and public displays of violence are two of the main reasons why the gang has not succeeded in transforming itself into a TCO. And while some criminal activity - most notably the MS13's involvement in petty drug dealing on a local level - is driving the gang's maturation process and leading it to new opportunities, this is a slow process that is causing significant conflict within the gang. El Salvador's MS13 leaders are trying to assert more control over the US East Coast. Some MS13 leaders, especially those operating from jails in El Salvador, are trying to create more top-down control, and expand its social and political influence. In El Salvador, the gang has negotiated delivering votes to some of the country's most powerful politicians. They have also instituted more formal and complex command structures inside and outside of jail, and they have emissaries in places as far away as Boston who are trying to corral the rudimentary and undisciplined gang cliques operating along the US East Coast. The MS13 is taking advantage of traditional migration patterns, not sending members to set up new cells. The MS13's efforts in El Salvador have alarmed law enforcement officials who say the gang's high-ranking leaders are also moving their rank-and-file around the region, including to the United States. But while the gang is repopulating cells and establishing new ones, the MS13 appears to be taking advantage of circumstances, rather than actively creating those circumstances. MS13 members migrate for the same reasons that other migrants do, and they go to the same places. They also face many of the same risks such as indigence, isolation, victimization, detention and deportation. This report is divided into five sections. We begin by chronicling the multi-national history of the MS13. The group is the byproduct of war, migration and policy, and it has a footprint in a half dozen nations. We then turn to the gang's philosophy, its guiding principles and ideology. The gang centers itself around the idea of community, which is reinforced mostly via violent rituals and expressions of rage towards outsiders and rivals. From there, we move to organizational structure. This includes explaining the largely misunderstood loose hierarchy of the gang and its clique system. Then we cover modus operandi, tackling the all-important questions of recruitment, criminal economy, use of violence, and political and social capital. Finally, we elaborate five case studies, which address the MS13's: 1) organizational structure; 2) use of violence; 3) criminal migration; 4) involvement in international drug trafficking; and 5) political and social capital. Details: s.l.: Insight Crime; Washington, DC: Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, 2018. 90p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 20, 2018 at: https://www.insightcrime.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/MS13-in-the-Americas-InSight-Crime-English.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Central America URL: https://www.insightcrime.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/MS13-in-the-Americas-InSight-Crime-English.pdf Shelf Number: 149182 Keywords: Criminal OrganizationDrug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceGang ViolenceGang-Related ViolenceGangsMara SalvatruchaMS13Prison Gangs |
Author: Demoscopia, S.A. Title: Maras y pandillas, comunidad y policia en Centroamerica Hallazgos de un estudio integral Summary: In the last decade, youth gangs have taken special relevance in Central America, becoming so much a problem of insecurity public as an object of concern for governments and fear among the population, on all in the countries of the northern triangle of the region -El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala - but with a development something similar also in Nicaragua and Costa Rica. While the existence of youth gangs dedicated to crime is nothing new in Central America, the systematization of the use of violence and brutality demonstrated by gangs current is something unprecedented; reflected in the new concept of "maras". In short, although it would not be correct to point out the maras as the main responsible for the high level of violence that for some time lives in Central America, without a doubt they represent a strong and real problem that deserves more attention, for the sake of providing security to citizens and improve future prospects for the population Young of the Region. Both history and social science teaches that juvenile delinquency is primarily a group phenomenon that reflects social situations and complex economics; deserving, therefore, updated, concrete and deep knowledge to achieve the design and implementation of policies and successful action programs. It is in this context that the Swedish International cooperation for development International (Sida) and the Central American Bank of Economic Integration (BCIE) have considered convenient to finance a regional study and multidisciplinary on the phenomenon of gangs and maras, with a contextual focus (maras-vecinoscommunity-police) and with a solid empirical base. The objective of this publication, which constitutes a condensed version of the study carried out by a group of researchers from the Demoscopy company S.A., is to facilitate a discussion broader and more purposeful public desire to contribute to efficient policies and actions, so much about the immediate need to face the current situation as in what refers to the prevention towards the future. (From Google Translate) Details: Guatemala, SIDA, 2007. 120p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 29, 2018 at: http://www.dhl.hegoa.ehu.es/ficheros/0000/0143/maras_y_pandillas_comunidad_y_policia_en_centroamerica.pdf Year: 2007 Country: Central America URL: http://www.dhl.hegoa.ehu.es/ficheros/0000/0143/maras_y_pandillas_comunidad_y_policia_en_centroamerica.pdf Shelf Number: 150733 Keywords: Gang ViolenceGangsMara SalvatruchaYouth Gangs |
Author: International Crisis Group Title: El Salvador's Politics of Perpetual Violence Summary: El Salvador, a small country in the isthmus of Central America, is wracked by an implacable strain of gang warfare. Exceptionally intense and persistent violence pits rival street gangs against one another and in opposition to the police and state. Formerly hailed for its smooth transition to democracy and for turning the two foes of its 1980s civil war into political forces competing vigorously yet peaceably for power, El Salvador once again is famed for its bloodletting. Its recent murder rates rank among the highest in the world and its jails are among the most overcrowded. For the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump, its main gang, the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), personifies the menace of undocumented immigration. Although the Salvadoran state has developed a series of strategies for violence prevention, its mainly repressive efforts over the past fifteen years have checked the influence of these alternative approaches. It should now implement plans to prevent crime, rehabilitate gang members and spur development in marginalised communities. Most urgently, El Salvador will require protection from the turbulence that U.S. mass deportations could provoke. The permanence of violence owes as much to the success as to the failings of the peace accords. The two former wartime foes have jostled for democratic supremacy, repeatedly using security policy for electoral purposes by seeking to satisfy public demand for mano dura (iron fist) against the gangs. Although government has changed hands, security methods have not altered: mass detentions and incarceration, as well as militarisation of policing, have become standard procedure whether under the rule of right-wing elites or former guerrillas. U.S. authorities have recently offered support to this approach, pledging to "dismantle" the MS-13. In private, however, high-level officials from across the country's political divide lament the harmful effects of this crackdown on over-stretched courts and front-line police. Blueprints geared to preventing the drift of young men from low-income neighbourhoods into gang life have been drafted: the government launched the most recent, the "Safe El Salvador" plan, as a holistic strategy to restore the state’s territorial control. But as violence soared after 2014 following the disintegration of a truce with the gangs, extreme measures of jail confinement and police raids have once again become the government's predominant methods to choke the gangs. Allegations of police brutality and extrajudicial executions have multiplied. Recent surveys suggest that veteran members of these gangs wish to cease the violence. However, the economic dead-end of El Salvador's urban outskirts – the country’s recent GDP growth rate of 1.9 per cent is among the lowest in Central America - continues to drive a supply of willing young recruits, and consolidate a rearguard of sympathisers dependent on income from the gangs' extortion schemes and other rackets. The reality and stigma of gang violence combine to block off alternative ways of life for those born into these communities, cutting years of schooling for young people in areas of high gang presence and alienating potential employers. Instead of succumbing to the state's offensive, gangs set up roadblocks in their neighbourhoods and impose their own law; their fight against security forces has claimed the lives of 45 police officers so far this year. The deadlock between a tarnished set of security policies and a gang phenomenon that thrives on the ostracism and contempt of mainstream Salvadoran society can only now be resolved by recasting the way the country treats its security dilemmas. Judicial and security institutions require careful reform to ensure resources are distributed to areas with the highest concentrations of violence, and used to boost intelligence-led policing that targets gang members committing the most serious crimes. Jail-based reinsertion schemes, and cooperation with diverse churches, NGOs and businesses that offer second chances to former gang members, must be strengthened to provide a legal framework for rehabilitation as well as material incentives for the gangs to eventually disband. Although the country’s main political parties and most of the public oppose any hint of negotiation with gangs, the reality in many poor areas is of constant daily encounters with these groups. Tolerance for these grassroots efforts, despite the existing legal restrictions on any contact with gangs, is essential to build the confidence that will be required for dialogue in the future. None of this will be easy, nor is it likely to be assisted by U.S. policy toward either gangs or Salvadoran immigrants. The potential cancellation of the rights to residency in the U.S. of 195,000 beneficiaries of the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) program threatens to overwhelm the Salvadoran state's capacity to accommodate returnees, not unlike the experience of the late 1990s when mass deportations of gang members from the U.S. to El Salvador exported the criminal capital that led to the lightning rise of the MS-13 and its main rival, the 18th Street gang. El Salvador is simply unprepared, economically and institutionally, to receive such an influx, or to handle their 192,700 U.S. children, many of them at the perfect age for recruitment or victimisation by gangs. At a time when levels of violence remain extraordinarily high, with exhaustion toward an unwinnable conflict voiced on both sides, the arrival of thousands of migrants back to their crime-affected homeland would impose huge strains. To escape its perpetual violence, El Salvador needs support, not the recurrence of past mistakes Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2018. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Latin America Report No. 64: July 30, 2018 at: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/064-el-salvador-s-politics-of-perpetual-violence.pdf Year: 2018 Country: El Salvador URL: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/064-el-salvador-s-politics-of-perpetual-violence.pdf Shelf Number: 150953 Keywords: Gang ViolenceGang-Related ViolenceGangsMara SalvatruchaMS-13Violent Crime |